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Abstract: We argue that labour turnover can increase profitability, contrary to 
conventional wisdom.  We analyse an extension of the Salop (1979) model of the impact 
of turnover that differentiates between incumbent and newly hired workers in the 
production function. An exogenous increase in the turnover rate can increase profits if 
firms do not choose wages unilaterally. Evidence from UK establishment-level data 
supports our theoretical priors and suggests that increased turnover can indeed increase 
profitability. 
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1.  Introduction 
Labour turnover is a pervasive feature of the labour market: in OECD countries 
approximately 10-15% of workers quit their jobs every year; 15% in the United States 
alone (OECD Employment Outlook, 1999, 2005). Labour turnover affects both workers 
and firms: workers may need to learn new job-specific skills, whilst firms incur the 
costs of hiring and training new workers. Incoming workers, however, may be better 
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educated and more highly skilled. Hence, turnover may actually enhance firm 
performance, a possibility which has attracted limited attention in the existing literature, 
which has focused on the impact of turnover on workers rather than on firms. The 
existing theory is mostly based on Salop (1979), where workers are identical and firms 
incur turnover costs; in this context, turnover reduces profits.  We analyse an extension 
to the Salop model that distinguishes between newly hired and incumbent workers. A 
higher turnover rate implies that the proportion of new hires in the workforce is larger: 
if this causes a sufficiently large increase in productivity and wages cannot be chosen 
unilaterally, then an increase in turnover can increase profits.    
2.  Theory 
Output depends on the labour input of newly hired and incumbent workers. New hires 
and incumbents have different levels of job-specific human capital and are imperfect 
substitutes. The production function is given by ( , , , )Y F h I λ σ= , where h  is the 
number of new hires, I  is the number of incumbents, λ  denotes exogenous production-
specific factors and σ  is the elasticity of substitution between new hires and 
incumbents.1 Firms pay all workers the same wage, 0>w , and the fixed unit cost of 
hiring and training new workers is 0>τ . The per-period turnover rate, i.e. the 
proportion of the existing workforce who quit, is a fixed function q  of wages and 
exogenous factors, including the general market wage that workers expect to earn if 
they quit, θ :  
( , )q q w θ=           (1) 
where 0wq < , 0wwq > , 0qθ > , 0qθθ <  and 0wq θ < .  In every period, qN  workers 
quit implying h qN=  and (1 )I q N= − . We consider the steady state and normalise 
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 See Garino and Martin (2007) for a more detailed analysis of aspects of this model. 
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output prices to unity.2 Profits are:  
NqwNqqNF )(),,)1(,( τλσ +−−=Π       (2) 
Assume the firm chooses employment and wages. At an interior solution, the first-order 
conditions are: 
0)()1( =+−−+=Π qwFqqF IhN τ        (3) 
[ ] 0)1()( =+−−=Π wIhww qFFqN τ        (4) 
If new hires and incumbents are perfect substitutes then 0FF Ih =−  and the model 
reduces to Salop (1979). The response of profits to turnover factors is obtained by 
comparative statics:  
0<=−−==
w

Ihq q
qNqFFNq )(
      (5) 
The negative sign arises because a rise in θ  can only increase profits if, for a given 
turnover cost, new hires are sufficiently more productive than incumbents at the margin. 
Since 0wq < , equation (4) implies that 0<−− τIh FF . At the optimal wage, new hires 
are less productive than incumbents and an increase in θ  reduces profits.  
Now suppose firms do not choose the wage unilaterally.3 There is only a first-
order condition for employment, so the impact of turnover on profits is: 
[ ]
wIhqw wqwqFFNqw −+−−=+= ))((     (6) 
The number of new hires increases by θθ qwqw +  and incumbents decrease by the same 
amount. The resulting change in output, )qwq)(FF( wIh θθ +− , is ambiguous, since the 
signs of both θθ qwqw +  and ( )Ih FF −  are ambiguous. In θθ qwqw + , wθ  is expected to 
be positive, 0<
w
q  and 0qθ > , while the sign of ( )Ih FF −  depends on the relative 
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 A dynamic version of our model is available on request.  
3
 E.g., if a firm negotiates wages with a union, wages will reflect all factors relevant to both firm and 
union, as well as their relative bargaining power (Garino and Martin, 2000). 
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productivities of incumbents and new hires. The remaining term θθθτ w)qwq( w ++  
represents the impact on profits of the change in total labour costs induced by a rise in 
θ , which is itself ambiguous. Overall, therefore, the sign of equation (6) is ambiguous. 
For sufficiently high levels of 
w
q
 and  hF , it could be positive. 
3.  Data and Methodology 
We analyse a sample of 1900 workplaces from the 2004 cross-section Workplace and 
Employee Relations Survey (WERS) (see Chaplin et al., 2005). The average quit rate in our 
sample, i.e. the proportion of employees on the payroll 12 months ago who stopped 
working at the workplace as they resigned or left voluntarily, is 13.28%. 
  Our sample of workplaces which set wages unilaterally comprises those 
workplaces where no employees have their pay set through negotiations with a trade 
union (1037 workplaces), with a mean quit rate of 17.52%. The corresponding sample 
of workplaces where wages are not set unilaterally comprise those where 100% of 
employees have their pay set via negotiations with trade unions (484 workplaces) with a 
mean quit rate of 7.82%.  Those workplaces where greater than 0% but less than 100% 
of their employees have their pay set through trade union negotiations form an 
intermediate category (379 workplaces).  
 We categorise workplaces according to whether their workplace’s financial 
performance as compared to other establishments in the same industry is: better than 
average; average for the industry; or below average and construct a three-point index 
representing financial performance: 
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where wp denotes the workplace subscript. We then conduct weighted ordered probit 
analysis to explore the determinants of 
wpFP :
4
 
wpwpwpwpwpwp vUWSNUWSUWSqNUWSqqXFP +++•+•++′= 54321
*
 (7) 
where *wpFP  represents a latent variable denoting the unobserved propensity of 
workplace wp to achieve a certain level of financial performance; 
wpq  denotes the quit 
rate; wpX  is a vector of workplace characteristics expected to influence 
*
wpFP  ; β  is the 
associated coefficients vector; 1  represents the coefficient on wpq ; (NUWS) UWS is a 
dummy variable indicating that the workplace is characterised by (non) unilateral wage 
setting; and wpv  is a random error term.  
To explore the robustness of our findings, we also adopt the generalised ordered 
probit approach, which is advantageous in that the cut-off points are allowed to vary 
between workplaces (see Williams, 2006). Finally, we allow for the possibility of 
reverse causality between financial performance and quits by adopting a two-stage 
probit least squares estimator, which jointly models financial performance and the quit 
rate. Financial performance is measured by a dummy variable taking the value of one if 
the workplace is in the above average category.  The estimates derived from this 
framework are consistent with corrected standard errors (see Maddala, 1983).5 
wpX  includes: industry; workplace size and age; foreign ownership; union 
density; an index of the percentage of the establishment’s sales revenue or operating 
costs accounted for by labour costs; operating hours of 24 hours a day; whether the 
establishment faces competition from overseas based suppliers; whether the current 
                                                
4
 The data was weighted as workplaces had different probabilities of being selected for the survey. The 
sampling frame for the 2004 WERS was the Inter-Departmental Business Register maintained by the 
Office for National Statistics. Differential sampling fractions have been used according to the number of 
employees and the 2003 Standard Industrial Classification (Chaplin et al., 2005). 
5
 A list of our over identifying instruments in the quit rate equation is available on request. 
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state of the market is growing; and whether over the last two years management has 
introduced changes in the organisation of work. Workforce characteristics include the 
proportions of: females, part-timers, fixed term contract workers, agency workers, 
managers, professionals, associate professional and technical employees, administrative 
and secretarial employees, skilled trade employees, personal service employees, 
operative employees and routine unskilled employees.  
4.  Results 
Table 1 summarises our results.  We present the marginal effects of an increase in the 
quit rate on the probability of observing each value of the dependent variable, wpFP .   It 
is apparent that there are distinct differences in the relationship between the quit rate and 
financial performance depending on whether wages are set unilaterally.  
In the case of unilateral wage setting, an increase in the quit rate reduces the 
probability of observing an above average financial performance and increases the 
probability of having average or worse performance.  Therefore, turnover is inversely 
related to profits, as predicted by our theory. This finding is robust across the three 
modelling approaches.  For establishments where no wages are set unilaterally, we find the 
opposite result, as increased turnover increases the probability of observing above average 
financial performance.  In this case, turnover is positively related to financial performance, 
which is again consistent with our theory. This result is also robust across the three 
modelling approaches. 
5. Conclusions 
We have explored the theoretical predictions of an extension to the efficiency wage model 
of Salop (1979), which separates incumbent and newly hired workers in the production 
function. Our empirical analysis of WERS 2004 confirms that the relationship between 
employee turnover and firm performance is influenced by whether workplaces are able to 
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set pay unilaterally. Our empirical findings accord with the theoretical predictions 
supporting a standard inverse relationship between quit rate and firm performance where 
workplaces choose wages unilaterally; and indicate a positive relationship if workplaces 
cannot choose wages unilaterally. 
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Table 1: Firm Performance and Quit Rates 
 
 
Overall Marginal Effects 
 Below Average 
wpFP  Average wpFP  Above average wpFP  
Unilateral Wage Setting    
Ordered Probit Model    
Quit Rate 0.0501 0.0851 -0.1352 
Generalized Ordered Probit Model    
Quit Rate 0.0356 0.1222 -0.1578 
Probit Least Squares Model    
Quit Rate   -0.1167 
Non Unilateral Wage Setting    
Ordered Probit Model    
Quit Rate -0.1268 -0.2153 0.3421 
Generalized Ordered Probit Model    
Quit Rate -0.0791 -0.2498 0.3288 
Probit Least Squares Model    
Quit Rate   0.1553 
Intermediate Firm Types    
Ordered Probit Model    
Quit Rate 0.2028 0.3445 -0.5472 
Generalized Ordered Probit Model    
Quit Rate -0.0058 0.8287 -0.8229 
Probit Least Squares Model    
Quit Rate   -3.9358 
Note: With the exception of the below average category, the marginal effects are significant 
at the 5% level.  
 
